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This paper studies the design of pension schemes in a society where fertility is en-
dogenous and parents diﬀer in their ability to raise children. In a world with perfect
information, a pay-as-you-go social security system is characterized by equal pensions
for all but diﬀerent contributions which may or may not increase with the number of
children. Additionally, fertility must be subsidized at the margin to correct for the
externality that accompanies fertility. In a world of asymmetric information, incentive-
related distortions supplement the Pigouvian subsidy. These may either require an
additional subsidy or an oﬀsetting tax on fertility depending on whether the redistri-
bution is towards people with more or less children. In the former case, pensions are
decreasing in the number of children; in the latter case, they are increasing.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The recent fertility decline in the West is often cited as a major impediment to the ﬁscal
solvency of pay-as-you-go social security systems. At the same time, the pay-as-you-go
feature of the social security systems has partly been blamed for causing the observed
fertility decline. The reason for this latter linkage is that in such systems, the size of
a person’s pension beneﬁts depends on everybody else’s fertility decisions leading to
a decentralized equilibrium outcome with “too few” children. It is thus not surprising
that some economists have recently advocated a policy of linking pension beneﬁts (or
contributions) to individuals’ fertility choices.
Such a policy raises a number of objections which one can group into “moral hazard”
and “adverse selection” problems. The moral hazard problem arises when individuals
do not have full control over fertility. The actual number of children in a family entails
a random component and does not necessarily coincide with the number the parents
initially intended to have. Making pension beneﬁts to be independent of the number
o fc h i l d r e nc a nt h e nb ev i e w e da sam e c h a n i s m to insure parents against such random
shocks. We have studied this problem in an earlier paper.1
The adverse selection problem, which is the subject of the current paper, arises when
individuals are heterogenous. Speciﬁcally, assume, as is often the case, that parents diﬀer
in the ability to raise children (of a certain quality). Such individual characteristics are
seldom publicly observable so that there is asymmetric information between parents
and the policy makers. Under this circumstance, linking pension beneﬁts to fertility
penalizes high-cost families (the low-ability parents). This in turn may have an adverse
redistributive impact. Put diﬀerently, it may not be possible to distinguish between
those individuals who have a small number of children due to high costs, from those
with low costs who try to free ride on the system. Consequently, the fertility-incentive
eﬀects of the pension system may have to be balanced against its redistributive impact.
This paper focuses on this potential trade-oﬀ between fertility incentives and redis-
tribution. It studies the design of pension systems in a setting in which individuals diﬀer
1Cremer et al. (2004a,b).
1in their cost of raising children (or alternatively in their preferences for their number
of children). Speciﬁcally, we consider two mechanisms for ﬁnancing pensions. The ﬁrst
relies on a storage technology which amounts to a fully funded system. The second is
the pay-as-you-go formula wherein the rate of return depends on the rate of population
growth. In this latter case, individuals’ fertility decisions entail an externality that has
to be taken into account in the design of the social security system. The paper’s main
message is that, even in the absence of moral hazard problems, the case for fertility
related pension beneﬁt si sn o ta ss t r o n gi tm a ya tﬁrst appear, and as it has been
advocated in some recent work.2
2 The model
2.1 The basics
Consider a two-period overlapping generations model in the steady-state. Each genera-
tion consists of two types of individuals who diﬀer in their “ability” to raise (productive)
children. Each type is characterized by a speciﬁc cost of raising n children
kj (n)=θjn, j =1 ,2,
with 0 <θ 2 <θ 1. Type 2 is thus the more able parent. All individuals are endowed with
the same level of exogenous income, y, and have identical preferences over the number
of children they will have, and present and future consumption.
Denote the proportion of type j by πj and deﬁne average fertility as
¯ n = π1n1 + π2n2. (1)
Introduce
zj = θjnj
to denote a j-type parent’s expenditure on children (excluding any subsidy he may
receive, or any tax that he may have to pay, for this purpose). It will become clear
below that whether z2 >z 1 or z1 >z 2, plays an important role in the type of solutions
that emerge.
2Sinn (2004), Abio et al. (2004), Fenge and Meier (2004) Van Groezen et al. (2003).
2To keep the model simple, we assume that preferences over present and future con-
sumption (cj,d j) and the number of children, nj, are represented by an additive utility
function. The lifetime utility of an individual of type j is written as
Uj = u(cj)+v(dj)+h(nj) (2)
where u(·),v(·) and h(·) are strictly concave functions. There are two potential mech-
anism for ﬁnancing second-period consumption: storage or a PAYGO pension plan.
Under the storage technology, part of the initial endowment y is invested in a fund
yielding a ﬁxed rate of return r. Under the PAYGO scheme, the government collects
taxes from the current young and distributes the proceeds to the retired according to
some rule to be designed. The rate of return of the PAYGO is ¯ n − 1. This corresponds
to what Samuelson (1958) called the biological rate of interest.
2.2 The Laissez-faire
Absent any government intervention, each individual maximizes his utility (2) subject
to his budget constraint




where the pension (or savings) technology is the storage. Using the superscript L for
laissez-faire, the optimality conditions are


















Given our assumptions on preferences, cj,d j and nj are all normal goods. The normality




The comparisons between the cL’s, the dL’s and the zL’s are ambiguous. However, given





of the same sign and opposite the sign of zL
2 − zL
1 .
3As an illustration, consider a logarithmic utility function,
Uj = αlncj + β ln dj + γ ln nj, (3)
where α+β+γ =1 .W i t ht h i ss p e c i ﬁcation, the laissez-faire implies that consumption










With a CES utility function, the comparison would depends on the elasticity of




In other words, in this special case, the less able family has less children but spends
more on raising them than the more able family does. A large elasticity of substitution
yields the opposite result. Between these cases lies the Cobb-Douglas (logarithmic)
speciﬁcation with a unitary elasticity of substitution and constant budget shares.
3 The utilitarian ﬁrst-best
Assume that the social planner controls all relevant variables in the economy and has
perfect information regarding every individual’s ability to raise children. The planner
determines which technology, storage or PAYGO, is used to ﬁnance old-age consumption
and it sets cj, dj,nj accordingly. We study the utilitarian solution which maximizes the





































where FS stands for “ﬁrst-best under storage” and µ is the Lagrange multiplier associ-



























The ﬁrst two equations imply cFS
1 = cFS
2 = cFS, dFS
1 = dFS




Decentralization of the ﬁrst-best solution is simple. It requires ﬁrst-period lump-sum
tax and transfers between the two types while allowing them to save for their retirement
voluntarily. Whether a type j (j =1 ,2) person receives a transfer or will have to pay
a tax depends on whether he spends more or less on child raising than a person of the
other type. Speciﬁcally, if type 1 persons spend more than type 2, they should each
receive a compensatory lump-sum transfer; if they spend less, they should pay a tax.
Alternatively, decentralization can be achieved through a fully funded pension system
where everyone receives the same pension but diﬀerent types pay diﬀerent contributions.
Thus type j persons each pay y −cFS
j −θjzFS
j ) when they work, and receive dFS when
they retire.3 Observe that contributions may depend on family size either positively or
negatively. If zFS
1 >z FS
2 ,m o r ea b l et y p e2 (who have a greater number of children) pay
more in contributions.4 If zFS
1 <z FS
2 , the opposite holds and contributions decrease
with family size.
3.1.1 First best versus laissez faire under storage
One can easily check that laissez faire and ﬁrst-best solutions coincide if zL
1 = zL
2 .
Moreover, it is also the case that if zL
1 >z L
2 ,t h eﬁrst-best solution will be characterized
3The only variable left to choose by households is then the number of children.
4Recall that consumption levels are equalized in the ﬁrst best.
5by zFB
1 >z FB




2 . To see these, assume zL
1 >z L
2 . Under




2.T oa t t a i nﬁrst-best, which requires the
equality for consumption levels, one must then redistribute from type 2 to type 1. With













2 .T h e s e




2 . A similar argument shows that if
zL
1 <z L
2 , the corresponding ﬁrst-best solution will be characterized by zFB
1 <z FB
2 .
Finally, observe that with the logarithmic utility (3), the ﬁrst-best and the laissez-
faire solutions coincide as zL
1 = zL
2 . In this case, pension contributions are the same for
all individuals.
3.2 Pay-as-you-go
















































Equations (7) and (8) are standard; they imply cFP
1 = cFP
2 = cFP and dFP
1 = dFP
2 =
dFP. Equation (9) has two interesting implications. The ﬁrst is that nFP
1 <n FP
2 .T h a t
is, as with storage, the more productive individuals should have more children. Secondly,
the equation shows that the existence of the PAYGO system aﬀects the tradeoﬀ between

















6where ¯ n is also evaluated at its ﬁrst-best value under PAYGO. The right-hand side of
this expression represents the net marginal cost of n, accounting for the “externality”
term dFP/¯ n2 which reﬂects the impact of one’s fertility on the rate of return of the
PAYGO system.5
To decentralize this solution, a Pigouvian subsidy at the rate of s = dFP/¯ n2 must
supplement the pension system. Thus, with PAYGO, expenditures on children are
subsidized at the margin.T h i sw a snot the case under storage. The marginal subsidy
implies that, under PAYGO, type 2 individuals who have a higher number of children will
always receive a larger Pigouvian subsidy.6 Nevertheless, this does not imply that they
are necessarily the beneﬁciaries of the pension system. The direction of net transfers
between the types depends, once again, on the expenditures on children. If zFP
1 >z FP
2 ,
there will be a net transfer from low-cost households (with many children) to high-cost
households (with fewer children); the opposite is true if zFP
1 <z FP
2 .
While individuals of diﬀerent types receive the same pensions, dFP,t h e yw i l lg e n e r -
ally pay diﬀerent contributions. Let Tj denote the j-type’s contribution. It then follows
from the individuals’ budget constraints that













Observe that Tj (j =1 ,2) will be greater than Tk (k 6= j)i fa n do n l yi ft h ej-type’s
expenditure on children net of subsidies received is smaller than k-type’s. Moreover,




































6This argument assumes a linear Pigouvian subsidy scheme.












¯ n2 − π1(z2 − z1).
Note that even in the Cobb-Douglas case, the contributions will be diﬀerent. In this













3.3 Storage versus PAYGO
The choice between storage and PAYGO depends on the respective levels of welfare
achieved, WFS and WFP.T h i si nt u r nw i l ld e p e n do nt h er e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e n1+r,
¯ nFP,a n d¯ nFS. However, the comparison is more complicated than in the standard


























so that the optimal allocation under PAYGO is also feasible under storage with a non-
binding resource constraint. Similarly, if 1+r =¯ nFP, storage continues to dominate
PAYGO. In this case, the return of the two systems is the same, but we know from the
results presented above that the allocations diﬀer. Moreover, whereas r is available on
an exogenous basis, the return of PAYGO is endogenous and imposes restriction on the
choice of n. Consequently, welfare must be strictly larger under storage.
































































81 1+r0 ¯ nFP
1+r
If ¯ nFS(r0) > 1+r0,P A Y G Oa tr0 Storage
Figure 1: The choice between storage and PAYGO.
and the optimal allocation under storage is feasible under PAYGO with a non-binding
resource constraint. Consequently, PAYGO dominates a storage technology that oﬀers
r if 1+r<¯ nFS(r). The comparison remains ambiguous if ¯ nFS < 1+r<¯ nFP.T h i s
is depicted in Figure 1. To the right of ¯ nFP, storage always dominates PAYGO. To the
left of ¯ nFP, if, given any r,t h er e s u l t i n g¯ nFS (which is a function of r) is greater than
1+r, PAYGO dominates. Otherwise, the outcome is not clearcut.8
Finally, observe that the comparison between nFS
j and nFP
j is in general ambiguous.
That nj will be subsidized under PAYGO but not under storage implies that, ceteris
paribus, nj will be higher under PAYGO. However, the income eﬀect may reverse this.
To the left of ¯ nFP, the “real” purchasing power of resources is higher under PAYGO as
compared to storage. This implies that nFP
j >n FS
j .T ot h er i g h to f¯ nFP,t h eo p p o s i t ei s
t h ec a s ea n dt h ei n c o m ee ﬀect leads one to choose a smaller value for nj under PAYGO.





The ﬁrst-best characterization rests on the assumption that the government observes θj
and can use all instruments. If types are not publicly observable, one has to resort to a
8One can easily show that the sign of dn
FS







FS i saf u n c t i o no fr. This can take positive as well as negative values and is not monotonic in
r. Consequently, one cannot divide the interval to the left of ¯ n
FP into distinct subintervals over which
PAYGO or storage dominate.
9tax-transfer policy which induces type revelation and leads to the appropriate fertility
rate. Thus assume that θj is not observable but the number of children, nj,i s . T h e
unobservability of types requires that zj = njθj and cj not to be observable either.
Otherwise, one could infer the value of θj. However, the second-period consumption
level, dj, can be observable–an assumption that we maintain throughout this section.
To write the second-best problem in terms of observable variables, one must replace
cj by Tj (the ﬁr s t - p e r i o dt a xl e v i e do nt h ej-type). We can then determine the utilitarian
allocation subject to the appropriate self-selection constraints. The solution can be
decentralized through non-linear functions T(n) and d(n) which specify contributions
and pensions as functions of the family size. Thus the j-type household chooses nj to
maximize u(y − T(nj) − njθj)+v(d(nj)) + h(nj). This yields the following ﬁrst-order
condition


















j = T0(nj) and d0
j = d0(nj). The left-hand-side of this expression speciﬁes the
net marginal tax on n for household j. It has two components: a ﬁrst-period tax, T0
j,
combined with a second-period transfer, d0
j, weighted by the intertemporal marginal
rate of substitution, v0 (dj)/u0 (cj). In the discussion below, it is more convenient to







where, at the optimum, sj is set equal to θj − h0 (nj)/u0 (cj).
4.1 Storage
Let cjk and Ujk (j 6= k =1 ,2) denote the consumption and the utility of a j-type who
mimics a k−type. We have
cjk = y − θjnk − Tk
Ujk = u(cjk)+v(dk)+h(nk).
10The optimal utilitarain allocation is obtained by maximizing the sum of individual util-
ities, subject to the resource constraint and the two potential self-selection constraints.












+ λ2 (U2 − U21)+λ1 (U1 − U12).
The ﬁrst-order conditions are:
∂L
∂T1
= −(π1 + λ1)u0(c1)+π1µ + λ2u0(c21)=0 , (12)
∂L
∂T2
= −(π2 + λ2)u0(c2)+π2µ + λ1u0(c12)=0 , (13)
∂L
∂d1







































π1 + λ1 − λ2
u0(c21)
u0(c1)














π2 + λ2 − λ1
u0(c12)
u0(c2)







9It follows from (14) that
π1 + λ1 − λ2 > 0,
and from (15) that
π2 + λ2 − λ1 > 0.
Moreover, with cj = y − θjnj − Tj,
c21 − c1 =( θ1 − θ2)n1 > 0,
c12 − c2 =( θ2 − θ1)n2 < 0.




π2π1 + π2(λ1 − λ2)
π2π1 + π1(λ2 − λ1)
. (20)
Next, we distinguish between three regimes: λ1 = λ2 =0 , λ2 > 0, λ1 =0and
λ2 =0 , λ1 > 0.
Regime 1. λ2 = λ1 =0 This solution corresponds to the ﬁrst-best where none of
the self-selection constraints binds. It will necessarily hold if at the laissez-faire solution
zL
1 = zL
2 so that there is no need for redistribution. With the logarithmic utilities (3), we
have precisely this case. More generally, this occurs whenever the ﬁrst-best allocation
satisﬁes the self-selection constraint. In turn, this arises when laissez-faire levels of
expenditure on children are “not too diﬀerent”.
Regime 2. λ2 > 0 and λ1 =0 In this regime, the prevailing self-selection constraint
is that of type 2. Put diﬀerently, type 1 beneﬁts from redistribution and type 2 is
tempted to mimic him by having less children (i.e., by choosing n1 rather than n2). To
discourage type 2 from mimicking type 1, the social planner sets d2 >d 1. This follows
immediately from (20). Consequently, in this regime, pensions increase with the family
size. The comparison between c1 and c2,h o w e v e r ,i sa m b i g u o u s .





which implies there is no distortion in the choice of n2. This is of course due to the fact
that in this regime redistribution is from type 2 to type 1.




















12where u0(c21)θ2 − u0(c1)θ1 < 0 because c21 >c 1 and θ2 <θ 1.10 Consequently, there is
ad o w n w a r dd i s t o r t i o ni nn1 (as compared to the ﬁrst-best tradeoﬀ wherein u0(c1)θ1 −
h0(n1)=0 ) . In words, to discourage type 2 from mimicking type 1, the social planner
“suggests” a low value of n1 that is not attractive to type 2, given h(·) and θ2.T h i s
means, as a matter of implementation, there will be a tax on n1.
Using (10)—(11), these results imply that s2 =0while s1 < 0. Consequently, marginal
subsidy rates are non-positive for all households. While this in itself is not surprising (at
least not under storage), it may appear to be at odds with the property that households
with many children (type 2) receive higher pensions than households with fewer children.
However, under closer scrutiny, it becomes clear that similar properties arise in standard
optimal tax models where marginal and average tax rates do not always go hand in
hand.11
Regime 3: λ1 > 0 and λ2 =0 In this regime, type 2 beneﬁts from redistribution
and type 1 is tempted to mimic him by having more children. To counter this, the
planner sets d2 <d 1 so that pensions now decrease with family size. This result is
easily established from (20). Moreover, making use of (18) and (19), it is now also the
case that c2 <c 1.










so that n2 is distorted upward. In this regime, the binding incentive constraint is to
prevent type 1 households from mimicking type 2 households by having more children.
To relax this constraint, the social planner induces type 2 to have even more children
(than they would in the laissez-faire).
I nt h ec a s eo ft y p e1p a r e n t s ,o n em a ye a s i ly show from (16) that no distortion is
to be imposed on n1. This is not surprising as, in this regime, redistribution is away
from type 1 and towards type 2. Using (10)—(11), these results imply that, in terms of
10With λ1 =0 ,f r o m( 1 4 ) ,π1 − λ2 > 0.
11For example, in the “normal case”of Stiglitz’s two-group model where the redistribution is from
high- to low-ability persons, low-ability individuals face a positive marginal income tax rate while their
average tax rate is negative.
13implementation, s1 =0and s2 > 0 so that marginal subsidy rates are non-negative for
all types of households.
Which regime? We have already seen that if the two types spend equal amounts on
raising children in the laissez faire,i . e .i fzL
1 = zL
2 ,t h elaissez faire and the optimal
utilitarian solutions coincide and regime 1 necessarily prevails. We show in the Appendix
that if zL
1 <z L
2 the prevailing regime is either 1 or 2, while if zL
1 >z L
2 ,w ew i l lh a v e
regime 1 or 3. Put diﬀerently, if the utilitarian solution calls for redistribution, it
will be towards the parents who spend more on raising children. Thus the self-selection
constraint that may constraint the extent of the redistribution will be that of the parent
who spends the least on his children.
Recall that in the ﬁrst best, there is full compensation for the diﬀerences in ex-
penditures with the consumption levels being equalized across types. In a world of
asymmetric information, this full equalization may or may not be achievable. When
it is not, redistribution is limited by the binding incentive constraints of parents who
lose from redistribution; namely, those who spend the least on raising their children. If
these are the parents who have more children (type 2), then to make the alternative
less appealing to them n1 is distorted downward and d1 is set less than d2.O n t h e
other hand, if the losers are the parent with less children, their alternative is made less
appealing by distorting n2 upward and setting d2 <d 1.
4.2 PAYGO
Assume now that the government controls dj’s through pensions, setting them at levels
such that there will be no private savings. One can then write the individual’s budget
constraint as
cj + θjnj + Tj = y,










14As with the storage, let cjk and Ujk (j 6= k =1 ,2) denote the consumption and the
utility of a j-type who mimics a k−type. We have
cjk = y − θjnk − Tk
Ujk = u(cjk)+v(dk)+h(nk).












+ λ2(U2 − U21)+λ1(U1 − U12),
where n is deﬁned by (1).
The ﬁrst-order conditions for this problem are
∂L
∂T1
= −(π1 + λ1)u0(c1)+π1µ + λ2u0(c21)=0 , (21)
∂L
∂T2
= −(π2 + λ2)u0(c2)+π2µ + λ1u0(c12)=0 , (22)
∂L
∂d1






































Observe that the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to nj, i.e. equations (25) and (26),
diﬀer from their storage counterparts. On the other hand, expressions (21)—(24) are
equivalent to (12—(15) under the storage, except that n has replaced (1 + r). Similar









along with equation (20) which continues to hold. We again have three possible regimes.
15Regime 1: λ2 =0and λ1 =0 The solution corresponds to the ﬁrst best. Pensions
are set equally (d1 = d2) and lump-sum taxes (contributions) are used to ensure c1 = c2.
Additionally, a Pigouvian subsidy is used to induce the optimal values of nj’s. In the
Cobb-Douglas case, where zL
1 = zL
2 , there is no net redistribution between the two types.
But with n2 >n 1 in the ﬁrst best, type-2 receives more subsidy for raising children.
Consequently, they will have to be taxed in the ﬁrst period to ensure there will be no
net transfers.
Regime 2: λ2 > 0 and λ1 =0 Comparisons between the consumption and pension
levels of the two types are exactly the same as in the storage. Speciﬁcally, it follows
from (20) that d2 >d 1 and pensions increase with the family size. The comparison
between c1 and c2 remains ambiguous.



















In words, there is a “Pigouvian” marginal subsidy on n for type 2 individuals. Ob-
serve that, as with storage, with the redistribution being away from type 2, incentive
considerations require no distortion to be imposed on type 2.






































The ﬁrst term in the right-hand side of (29) is the Pigouvian subsidy (adjusted by the
fact that the “marginal cost of public fund” is no longer equal to one). The second term
is the distortion aimed at relaxing the binding incentive constraint of type 2 households
(who are hurt by redistribution). As with the storage, this term is negative thus inducing
ad o w n w a r dd i s t o r t i o no nn1. Consequently, the sign of s1 is ambiguous. There is a
conﬂict between externality (requiring a subsidy to induce a higher value for n1)a n d
incentive (requiring a tax to induce a lower value for n1)t e r m s . 12
Regime 3: λ1 > 0 and λ2 =0 The comparisons between consumption and pension
levels are, once again, exactly the same as with storage. Speciﬁcally, it follows from (20)
that d2 <d 1. Hence pensions decrease with family size, even though fertility entails a
positive externality. Moreover, making use of (27) and (28) we obtain, as with storage,
c2 <c 1.


























In this case, externality and incentive terms are of the same sign and we necessarily
have a marginal subsidy on n2 (a negative marginal tax). This implies that s2 > 0.
In the case of type-1 parents, proceeding in the same manner as in regime 2, one




with no distortions due to incentive considerations (recall that redistribution is away
from type 1).
12Recall that s is the marginal subsidy. A negative value thus means a positive marginal tax.
175C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has shown that the design of a pension system depends mainly on two
factors: whether the system is based on storage or is PAYGO, and the relative size of
the expenditures on raising children incurred by the two types. The ﬁrst factor is related
to the inherent externality in a PAYGO social security system. Increasing the number
of one’s (productive) children bestows a positive externality on others by increasing the
biological rate of return of the system. This is operative only in the PAYGO setting and
its internalization requires a subsidy on having children. The second factor is related
to the elasticity of substitution between consumption and fertility. In case of unitary
elasticity (when the utility function is logarithmic) both types spend the same amount
on raising children and there is no need for redistribution. When one type spends more,
that type should be “compensated”.
We have shown that if the redistribution is from type 1 (who have fewer children)
to type 2 (who have more children), one must distort n2 upward for incentive consid-
erations. This will reinforce the externality correction (requiring a Pigouvian marginal
subsidy) and the net eﬀect requires a subsidy on n2. On the other hand, if the redis-
tribution is towards type 1, one must distort n1 downward. This requires a tax on n1
and works in opposite direction to the marginal Pigouvian subsidy. The ﬁnal outcome
would then depend on the relative values of the distortion due to incentives and the
Pigouvian term. In both cases, the person whom one redistributes away from, must
face a Pigouvian subsidy only with no incentive-related distortion. These results sug-
gests a distinction between net redistributive goals achieved by average taxation, and
changing the behavior at the margin achieved by marginal taxation.
18Appendix
A1 The prevailing regimes at the second-best optimum
under storage
We show that if zL
1 >z L
2 , the incentive constraint of type 1 individuals cannot be binding
at the second-best optimum. Consequently, in this case, regime 2 cannot prevail and
one has either regime 1 or regime 3. Formally, we have
Lemma 1 If zL
1 >z L
2 , then at the second-best optimum under storage, one cannot have
both λ1 > 0 and λ2 =0 .
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Assume λ1 > 0 and λ2 =0so that the
incentive constraint U1 ≥ U12 is binding. Using superscript SS for the second-best
























+ θin = y + ∆; (A3)
so that Ψi(∆) is household i’s (i =1 ,2) maximal utility when facing the budget con-
straint (A3) and the (given) net transfer ∆. With λ1 > 0 and λ2 =0 , ﬁrst-order
conditions (12), (14) and (16) imply that (cSS
1 ,d SS
1 ,n SS









19In words, allocation (cSS
1 ,d SS
1 ,n SS
1 ) yields the maximal utility for type 1 households
given ∆ = ∆SS
1 .13 Clearly then, only if ∆ > ∆SS
1 ,i tw i l lb ep o s s i b l ef o rt y p e1t oh a v e





2 , must be greater than ∆SS
1 . Making use of the
resource constraint under storage, it follows that
∆SS
















Thus W(.) represents the maximum utilitarian welfare, in the absence of the incentive
constraints, as a function of the net transfers to type 1 households (with the transfers to







Now diﬀerentiating (A4), using the envelope theorem, yields
W0(∆1)=π1(u0(c1) − u0(c2)),
so that W(.) is increasing in ∆1 i fa n do n l yi fc1 <c 2.B u t ,w i t hzL
1 >z L
2 , the normality
of c implies c1 <c 2 whenever ∆1 < 0. Consequently, W(.) is increasing in ∆1 whenever
∆1 < 0. Hence ∆SS






Given that the laissez-faire solution corresponds to ∆1 =0 , the above inequality implies
that welfare at the second best optimum is smaller than welfare at the laissez-faire
solution. This is a contradiction because the laissez-faire is feasible in the second-best.
In exactly the same way, one can prove that
13Recall that we have the “no distortion at the top” property for type 1 here.
20Lemma 2 If zL
1 <z L
2 , then at the second-best optimum under storage, one cannot have
both λ1 =0and λ2 > 0.
Thus, if zL
1 <z L
2 , regime 3 cannot prevail, and one has either regime 1 or regime 2.
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